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LOSS DISTRIBUTION BY COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE
By CHARLES 0. GREGORY*
INTRODUCTION
THE familiar rules of loss distribution in negligence actions are
beginning to give way to more equitable notions. In many
states a non-negligent plaintiff may no longer place where he
chooses the loss he sustains from the joint negligence of others.,
And in a few jurisdictions one who sustains damages may recover
a portion of his loss in spite of his admitted contributory negli-
gence.2 There are even instances of a combination of these features
of contribution between tortfeasors and comparative negligence,
with apportionment of fault and division of loss accordingly.'
With the realization that the word "negligence" has become in
a modern world little more than a moral sounding tag signifying a
basis for liability in damages, has apparently come the conviction
that each of several negligent parties responsible for the same
loss is justified in requiring that this loss should be fairly divided
among them. The chief reason for this change seems to be the
inevitability of accidents involving several parties, all or more than
*Associate Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, on leave of
absence for one year as Solicitor of Labor in the United States Department
of Labor, Washington, D. C.
'For an account of contribution between tortfeasors from various
angles, including citations of statutes and cases, see Leflar, Contribution
and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, (1932) 81 U. Pa. L. Rev: 130; (1936)
Report of the Law Revision Commission of New York 701-747; Notes(1911) 11 Col. L. Rev. 665; (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 349; Legis. (1931)
45 Harv. L. Rev. 369; Gregory, Procedural Aspects of Securing Tort
Contribution in the Injured Plaintiff's Action, (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev.
209; Gregory, Tort Contribution Prartice in New York, (1935) 20 Corn.
L. Q. 269.2See for citations and discussion Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribu-
tion in Negligence Actions, ch. 8, p. 56; Mole and Wilson, A Study of
Comparative Negligence, (1932) 17 Corn. L. Q. 333, 604.
sSee the Canadian statute, e.g., Ontario, Statutes 1930, 20 Geo. V, ch.
27, amended in 1931 21 Geo. V, ch. 26.
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one of whom are equally "at fault." Since the nature of so-called
fault sufficient to warrant liability for damages or to prevent re-
covery because of contributory negligence is ceasing to be regarded
as morally reprehensible, the conviction is growing that a party's
negligence ought not to bar him from securing a fair division of
the damage arising out of a single negligence transaction.
It is not the purpose of this article to treat with contribution be-
tween tortfeasors except as a device to be used in combination with
comparative negligence and apportionment of fault and loss ac-
cordingly. That subject has been discussed at considerable length
elsewhere from various points of view.- The purpose rather is to
set forth in sharp relief the fundamental requirements of a prac-
ticable comparative negligence statute, including the procedural
and administrative features deemed necessary to its successful
operation.
OBIEcTIVES ATTAINABLE THROUGH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The strict rules of common-law negligence have never been
popular. Aside from the developments in admiralty,5 the first use
of comparative negligence at common law to mitigate the harsh-
ness of contributory negligence was the device of gross negligence.
In many jurisdictions, if the negligent plaintiff could show that
the defendant's negligence was gross as compared to his, the plain-
tiff might still recover in spite of his own negligence. Other juris-
dictions reached the same result by using the nomenclature of
wilful or wanton indifference instead of gross negligence; and the
doctrine of last clear chance is, in some ways, related to these
devices.6
The use of these devices, however, permitted the plaintiff to
recover his entire damages and not a proportional part of them.
The loss had to fall entirely on the plaintiff or entirely on the
defendant. In the latter case, the device completely nullified the
legal effect of the defense of contributory negligence, and this
device is simple and effective if this result is desired.
Many state compensation acts and the federal employers' lia-
bility act, as well as a few isolated railroad crossing statutes, in-
4Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, (1932) 81
U. Pa. L. Rev. 130.5See as to the admiralty rules Mole and Wilson, A Study of Compara-
tive Negligence, (1932) 17 Corn. L. Q. 333, 339-59.
6See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
ch. 7, p. 49.
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elude comparative negligence provisions for a different purpose."
These measures provide that if a plaintiff (employee or vehicle
driver) is hurt, partly because of his own negligence, such negli-
gence shall not be a complete defense but shall diminish his recov-
erable damages in some indicated proportion. These are some-
what unusual cases, of course, since the employers' liability in the
compensation cases did not depend upon negligence in the first
place and since the extra hazard at a railroad crossing might war-
rant extraordinary remedial facilities. Nevertheless, the im-
portant thing to note is that the loss is not left entirely on the
plaintiff or defendant but is split between the two roughly in
accordance with the estimated negligence of the plaintiff.
Nebraska and Wisconsin statutes have introduced interesting
variations on the devices just discussed for application, apparently,
to all negligence actions involving injury to person and property.
The Nebraska statute" reads as follows:
"In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a
person or to his property caused by the negligence of another, the
fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negli-
gence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was
gross in comparison but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in
proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable
to the plaintiff; and all questions of negligence and contributory
negligence shall be for the jury."
Here, it is seen, the comparison of slight-gross is made as a sort
of condition precedent to the application of the apportionment of
loss clause. For unless it appears first that the plaintiff's negli-
gence was slight in comparison with the defendant's gross negli-
gence, an issue of importance only if the defendant has first pleaded
and offered proof of contributory negligence, the court will not
permit the plaintiff to invoke the comparative negligence feature
of apportionment of fault and incidental division of loss accord-
ingly. On top of all this, the supreme court of Nebraska has fool-
ishly retained the last clear chance doctrine9 which most leading
jurists recognize as a sheer expedient to allay the harshness of
common-law contributory negligence, a wholly unnecessary ad-
junct in a state having a comparative negligence statute of any
7See Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, (1932)
17 Corn. L. Q. 333, 604-25.
$Nebraska, Comp. Stats. 1929, sec. 20-1151.
9Cf. Seiffert v. Hines, (1922) 108 Neb. 62, 187 N. W. 108; Stanley
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., (1925) 113 Neb: 280, 202 N. W. 864.
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sort. The restricted scope of this Nebraska statute is obviously
little improvement over the common-law devices of loss distribu-
tion and, in fact, achieves invidious distinctions in denying recovery
to a negligent plaintiff whose fault is determined as being of the
same character and kind as that of the defendant.
The Wisconsin statute is not much different, but it seems much
more retrogressive when viewed from the perspective of the high-
ly advanced tort contribution practice developed by the supreme
court of that state without the aid of the legislature. The Wis-
consin statute 0 reads as follows:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to rjecover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall
be diminished by the jury in the proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering."
The similarity of this statute to that of Nebraska is apparent.
Instead, however, of employing the slight-gross formula as a pre-
requisite to application of the statute, Wisconsin uses the less-
greater test, a slightly broader preliminary requisite than that used
by Nebraska, inasmuch as a plaintiff's negligence may conceivably
be less than a defendant's without the latter's negligence being
gross in comparison. Thus, before the statute applies at all, it
must appear that the plaintiff's negligence was "not as great as"
the negligence of the defendant. If it appears that the plaintiff's
negligence is as great as or greater than the defendant's, the ordi-
nary rules of common-law contributory negligence apply, and the
plaintiff's claim is completely barred.
This gives rise to a somewhat anomalous situation. Suppose
P and D collide with their automobiles under circumstances indi-
cating that each was negligent, P suffering damage of $5,000. If
the evidence indicates to the court that the plaintiff's negligence
is less than the defendant's, the court will permit the jury to ap-
portion the negligence and to diminish the plaintiff's recoverable
damages accordingly. Theoretically the jury could find in such a
case that the plaintiff's negligence was 49 per cent of the combined
fault, and that the defendant's was 51 per cent. The result of
this finding would be a verdict of $2,550 for the plaintiff. This
is in accordance with the method of apportionment and division
of loss worked out by the Wisconsin court. But if the jury finds
loWisconsin, Stats. 1933, sec. 331.045.
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that the plaintiff and defendant were equally negligent, a shift
of only 1 per cent each way, the plaintiff can recover nothing under
the statute. It is likely that more harm than good will eventually
result from a statute of this sort.1
But this is not all. In Wisconsin's excellent practice permitting
contribution between tortfeasors, no feature of comparative negli-
gence with apportionment of fault and loss accordingly was ever
devised by the court. One of the first questions raised after pas-
sage of the statute was concerning the effect of the statute on this
tort contribution practice. This practice, of course, presupposed
mutual negligence on the part of parties to an action for contribu-
tion, which negligence had resulted in recoverable damage to some
other party. The court had taken the attitude that the claimant
for contribution could recover, if he had compensated the damaged
party, half of what he had paid in discharge of such party's claim,
as contribution, whether the claimant for contribution had been
equally negligent with, or more or less negligent than, his defen-
dant. After the comparative negligence statute was passed, how-
ever, the court has apparently taken the attitude that it could not
apply to contribution cases, recognizing that an anomaly exists
and refusing to change its contribution practice in any way.' 2 It
seems clear, then, that the splendid effort which the Wisconsin
court initiated to develop a truly modern system of loss distribu-
tion based on negligence was checkmated by a piece of inconsistent
and probably poorly thought out legislation.
The Mississippi legislature in adopting its comparative negli-
gence statute apparently envisioned a system of loss distribution
of a sort more comprehensive than any yet discussed, to apply in
all kinds of negligence actions. The statute' of that state reads as
follows:
"In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where
such injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the
fact that the person injured, or the owner of the property, or per-
son having control over the property may have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall
be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person injured, or the owner of the
property, or the person having control over the property."
"For this in general see an excellent and comprehensive article by
Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law, (1932) 7 Wis. L. Rev.
222, particularly at 228 and 246; see also Gregory, Legislative Loss Distri-
bution in Negligence Actions, ch. 8, p. 64.
22See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
ch. 8, p. 66.13Mississippi, Code Ann. 1930, sec. 511.
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Under this act no preliminary inquiry of a slight-gross or
less-greater nature is involved. The plaintiff may recover even if he
was equally negligent with the defendant or, indeed, more negli-
gent. The only restriction is that in such a case his recoverable
damages are diminished accordingly. Thus, it is apparent, the ob-
jective of the Mississippi legislature is radically different from
that of either Nebraska or Wisconsin, in that it is intended to
eliminate contributory negligence as a complete defense in all cases
and not just in the cases where the plaintiff, although negligent,
was not as negligent as the defendant. In this way the legislature
saved its courts an immense amount of cumbersome administra-
tive and legalistic detail and at the same time penalized the too
negligent plaintiff by providing for a substantial decrease in his
recoverable damages.
The Mississippi statute, however, attempts in one sentence to
introduce a system of loss distribution that is very complicated
indeed. Conceivably, with a highly developed ancillary practice
and procedure, the one sentence statute providing the main prin-
ciple would be adequate, although this is hard to imagine without
facilities for contribution between joint tortfeasors. But Missis-
sippi affords no such facilities and its statute can apply only to the
most simple cases.
Suppose, for instance, that T and A collide because of their
mutual negligence, T suffering damage of $5,000 and A of $3,000,
T's negligence being 40 per cent and A's 60 per cent of the whole.
In T's suit against A, unless A may file a counterclaim, T will
recover $3,000 or 60 per cent of his loss, whereas it is clear he
should recover only $1,800, or the difference between the total
loss attributable to him ($8,000 times 40 per cent or $3,200) and
the loss he actually sustained ($5,000). It is not clear that in
Mississippi A would not have to bring a separate action against
T, in which action a different jury hearing a different presentation
of the same evidence might find the damages differently, as well as
the apportionment of the negligence.
And if there were three parties involved, each suffering damage
and each negligent, the further complication, where each cannot
file his claim in the same action, and where two parties jointly sued
cannot protect themselves from unequal distribution of loss by
mutual cross-claims for contribution, becomes glaringly apparent.
Some of the Canadian jurisdictions have shown a proper ap-
preciation of the real difficulties involved, and of these, only
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Ontario has made a real attempt to solve them. It should be noted,
of course, that these jurisdictions have endorsed the broad type
of loss distribution system, retaining negligence as the basis of
liability, rather than the narrow type of objective adhered to in
Nebraska and Wisconsin.
Since the Ontario statute and practice thereunder is the most
highly developed instance of a loss distribution system based on
comparative negligence and division of loss according to appor-
tionment of fault, the balance of this section will be devoted to
it. The Ontario statute 14 reads, in part, as follows:
"3. Where damages have been caused or contributed to by the
fault or neglect of two or more persons the court shall deter-
mine the degree in which each of such persons is at fault or negli-
gent, and where two or more persons are found liable they shall
be jointly and severally liable to the person suffering loss or
damage for such fault or negligence, but as between themselves,
in the absence of any contract express or implied, each shall be
liable to make contribution and indemnify each other in the degree
in which they are respectively found to be at fault or negligent.
"4. In any action for damages which is founded upon the
fault or negligence of the defendant if fault or negligence is found
on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to the damages, the
court shall apportion the damages in proportion to the degree of
fault or negligence found against the parties respectively.
"5. If it is not practicable to determine the respective degree
of fault or negligence as between any parties to an action, such
parties shall be deemed to be equally at fault or negligent.
"6. Whenever it appears that any person not already a party to
an action is or may be wholly or partly responsible for the damages
claimed, such person may be added as a party defendant upon such
terms as may be deemed just."
In passing it may be remarked that highly developed as this
statute is, it neglects to make clear a factor expressly covered in
the more simple British Columbia statute,1 section 2(b) of which
reads as follows: "Nothing in this section [the essential part of the
Act] shall operate so as to render any person liable for any loss
or damage to which his fault has not contributed." This point,
however, will be referred to later.
The Ontario Act is, of course, buttressed by a very advanced
system of procedure and practice contained in their statutes and
rules of court. Under this statute all claims arising out of a single
transaction may be. and in many cases have been, raised and liti-
14Ontario, Statutes 1930, 20 Geo. V. ch. 27, amended in 1931, 21 Geo.
V, ch. 26.
'-'British Columbia, Statutes 1925, ch. 8.
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gated in the same action and are governed by a common and con-
sistent set of special findings concerning damage, cause and pro-
portional negligence. Thus, suppose T, A and B collide under
circumstances indicating that each is negligent, T suing A and B
jointly. Under Ontario practice, A and B may file cross-claims
against each other for contribution and damages and may also file
counterclaims against T for damages. The effect of these plead-
ings, of course, is to make A virtually a plaintiff suing T and B
jointly for his damages, and B a plaintiff suing T and A jointly
for his damages, which necessitates further cross-claims for contri-
bution between T and A concerning possible joint liability for B's
damages, and between T and B concerning possible joint liability
for A's damages. This may sound complicated, but it is perfectly
simple and logical, and is the only way in which an intelligent
distribution of loss can be approached from the pleading angle on a
consistent set of findings concerning damage, cause and negligence
arising out of the same transaction or accident.18
After this pleading the case is tried and the jury makes a
series of special findings, based on all the evidence submitted by a
common group of witnesses whose testimony is germane to each
claim raised. Suppose the jury's evidence is as follows: All three
parties were negligent, and each suffered damage to which his own
as well as the negligence of the other two contributed, 20 per cent
of the negligence being attributable to T, 30 per cent to A and 50
per cent to B; T suffering damage of $5,000, A, $4,000 and B,
$3,000. The task remains for the trial court to enter judgment
on this special verdict, and it is submitted that this is an extremely
simple task, far safer for the trial judge to perform than for the
jury.
Since it is apparent that $12,000 damage occurred, of which
B is responsible for half, A for 30 per cent and T 20 per cent, B's
share of the burden of loss is $6,000, A's $3,600 and T's $2,400.
Therefore T should recover the difference between his actual loss
of $5,000 and his share of the burden of loss, $2,400, or $2,600;
A, the difference between his actual loss, $4,000 and his share of
the burden of loss, $3,600, or $400; and B must supply the differ-
ence between his actual loss of $3,000 and his share of the burden
of loss, $6,000, or $3,000, and the slate is cleaned by the court
16For a detailed discussion, with a variety of hypothetical fact situations,
see Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions, ch. 11,
p. 88, with particular reference to a graphic illustration of the pleadings
of one of such actions on page 103.
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awarding T a judgment against B for $2,600 and A a judgment
against B for $400.
This situation could be varied readily by a finding that T's negli-
gence contributed only to his own damage, whereas A's and B's
negligence contributed not only to T's but to that of each other,
the rest of the findings remaining unchanged. The judges task
here is a little more difficult, but not appreciably so. T's verdict
should be 80 per cent of his damages or $4,000, because he caused
20 per cent of his own loss. This $4,000 is split between A and B
on their mutual cross-claims for contribution on a 30/50 basis, in
accordance with their respective degrees of negligence. Thus
three eighths of this loss, or $1,500, is placed on A and five
eighths, or $2,500, is placed on B. Then A should recover five
eighths of his loss of $4,000 from B as damages, or $2,500, and B
should recover three eights of his loss of $3,000 from A as damages,
or $1,125. However T executes his joint judgment for $4,000,
assuming that the somewhat unsuitable device of joint and several
judgment is retained under such a statute as it is in Ontario, after
the set-off occurs between A and B with respect to their cross-
claims for damages, T will have recovered $4,000, of which A
will have paid $1,500 and B, $2,500, and A will recover as damages
from B $1,375, being the difference between A's claim of $2,500
recoverable damages against B, and B's against A for $1,125.
Thus A, besides his $4,000 damage, will be out of pocket $125 cash,
and B, besides his $3,000 damage, will be out of pocket $3,875.
But these are only two of the many types of cases which may
arise. Others may present even more complicated situations al-
though this is unlikely.'7  It will be noted that these cases are
disposed of on the assumptions: (1) that all parties are financially
responsible and (2) that they are willing to pay into court or to
the judgment creditors what it is decided they properly owe. If
all the judgments on all the claims presented were entered and exe-
cuted the result might be chaos. And such possibilities have to be
seriously contemplated by a legislature choosing to introduce a
system of really equitable loss distribution based on comparative
negligence.
It cannot be too plainly and frequently stated, however, that
any jurisdiction desiring a system of loss distribution such as that
now in vogue in Ontario (the only type which really distributes the
loss fairly and equitably under a legal system retaining negligence
17See for a list of actual cases in briefed form Appendix A, p. 179 of
Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions.
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as the basis of liability) must provide facilities of procedure and
practice permitting all of the claims arising out of a single fact
transaction or accident to be filed and litigated in the same action.
Otherwise there can be absolutely no assurance that the loss dis-
tribution which would ultimately take place after a series of law
suits concerning these claims, involving the judgments of different
juries with respect to the same evidence and the same testimony
from the same witnesses regarding the same fact transactions and
parties, will be uniform and consistent.
Although this may seem a very radical change presenting in-
superable obstacles to many legislatures, it can be done and it has
incidental compensations. The saving in time, trouble and expense
to the courts, jury panels, parties, witnesses and commonwealth
are apparent. It is true that the lawyer interested in making a
good living at the expense of the parties involved frequently asks
of the reformer: "Why have one law suit when you can have two
or more ?" But to the progressive and public-minded citizen whose
real interest is the advance of legal administration and the promul-
gation of justice, the proper question would seem to be: "Why
have two or more law suits when you can do it all in one and so
much more fairly and efficiently at that?"
SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN ADOPTING THE ONTARIO METHOD
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that none should
enter the field of thoroughgoing loss distribution in negligence
actions by comparative negligence with apportionment of negli-
gence and division of loss accordingly unless he is ready to under-
stand really what he is getting into and, after having taken the
first step, to take the additional steps necessary to achieve the
goal. A part way measure like that in Mississippi is worse than
no step at all, because it merely emphasizes the unfairness of the
common-law system of contributory negligence in the many cases
it doesn't touch. The Nebraska and Wisconsin methods are all
right if such half way measures are desired; but the inconsistency
created in Wisconsin would appear to be anything but desirable.
In the following pages will be noted briefly various practical
points which should be investigated by any legislature contemplat-
ing a statute based on comparative negligence with apportionment
of fault and division of loss accordingly.
1. Contribution between Tortfeasors.-The device of contribu-
tion between joint tortfeasors seems to be essential to any prac-
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ticable plan of thoroughgoing loss distribution in negligence actions.
Its need in every case where jointly sued defendants are found to
have negligently contributed to the damage of a negligent plaintiff
whose negligence, in turn, has contributed only to his own damage,
is readily apparent. The inconsistency of permitting one who is
negligent to recover damages in spite of such negligence and of
denying one who is negligent the right to shift part of the burden
of paying some plaintiff's damages to another who jointly con-
tributed with him to such damages, simply because such claim is
for contribution instead of damages, is obvious. And if suits for
damages are to be governed by apportionment of fault with divi-
sion of loss accordingly, so should claims for contribution. The
recent English statute1 8 providing only for contribution between
tortfeasors permits proportionate contribution in accordance with
respective percentages of negligence, but in Wisconsin, where a
comparative negligence statute of sorts exists, contribution between
tortfeasors is not on a similar basis at all, but has been retained
on an arbitrary share and share alike basis.
The intricacies of contribution between tortfeasors might, of
course, fill several articles. Much has been written concerning the
essential requirements of a workable contribution statute, both
from the substantive and procedural point of view. It is felt,
however, that in a state adopting a loss distribution based on com-
parative negligence, the contribution feature may be combined with
the statute.
2. Allocation of Fault, Loss and Insolvency of Parties.R9 Al-
though the Ontario statute and practice thereunder embody a
thoroughgoing apportionment of fault in negligence actions, it is
open to question as to what is the best method of doing this. To
the writer it has seemed most advisable to treat all the negligence
involved (and in discussing negligence for this purpose it occa-
sionally seems necessary to regard this concept as a quantitative
hypostasis) as a unit and attempt to divide it up among all of the
parties involved, and to govern their claims accordingly.
Thus, suppose T, A and B have a three-cornered collision in
which each is equally negligent, only T suffering damage. If T
sues A and B jointly, shall we say that half of the negligence should
1sLaw Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) (1935) Act 25 & 26
Geo. V, ch. 30, sec. 6, 7 and 8 discussed in Legis., (1935) 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 312.19See in general Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence
Actions, ch. 9, p. 72. For distributing risk of insolvenoy in particular, see
p. 142 et seq.
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be attributed to each side of the law suit, thus permitting T to
recover only 50 per cent of his actual damage, or shall we say
one-third is attributable to T and two-thirds to the defendants
jointly? And if we do the latter, had we not best require a specific
allocation of percentages to each of A and B, to govern claims
for contribution arising between them in that action? And to
govern their mutual claims, should two-thirds of the negligence
be attributed to them jointly, or should it be one-third to each
from the beginning, the size of T's recovery against them jointly
to be determined by adding their respective percentages of fault?
This may not seem to make much difference in the easy hypo-
thetical case under discussion, but it is of great practical importance
where the percentages of negligence as among the parties vary.
Now suppose in the above case that T chooses to sue only A.
Shall B's negligence be included in determining the apportionment
of fault, so that the finding would be one-third to T and one-third
to A; and if so shall T recover for one-third or two-thirds of his
damage, or shall B be ignored and the negligence fixed as fifty per
cent for T and the same for A, with T recovering just half of his
damages from A? And, if so, shall T have action for the remain-
ing one-sixth from B? And if T sues only A, and A adds B as a
third party in order to claim contribution, T not amending his
complaint to include B, shall B still be ignored in allocating loss
so that T shall recover only 50 per cent of his actual loss, half of
which A may shift to B; or shall T take two-thirds of his loss from
A as if B were a codefendant, leaving A to shift half of this burden
to B?
The situations could be varied almost infinitely and since it is
impossible to do more than to raise the problem because of limited
space, reference is made to the writer's more detailed discussion
elsewhere. Suffice it to say that decisions on these points are not
controlled by arithmetical considerations but are rather conclusions
concerning grave matters of policy.
An additional matter should be noted in passing, concerning
the possibility that the joint judgment is unsuitable under a system
of this sort unless it appears that A in no event, if he is called upon
in the above case to pay a judgment for two-thirds of T's damages,
will be saddled with more of the loss than T himself eventually
suffers. In other words A must not be made to bear more risk of
B's insolvency in contribution proceedings than does T himself.
Unless some allowance is made for B's insolvency in such a case,
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it would be far better to junk the joint judgment and give T two
judgments against A and B, both executable, each for one-third
of the damages, with the understanding that if, say, A pays all his
and B does not, A will, by further payment to T, share equally
with T as to B's inability to pay, so that T and A, having been
equally at fault, will bear equal parts of T's loss.
This matter of allocating fairly the risk of insolvency is ex-
tremely important and is discussed in considerable detail else-
where.20 In spite of its great importance in the development of a
fair system of loss distribution of this sort, it has been entirely
overlooked in all existing statutes. Its significance is much greater
than has been indicated in this limited space and to be truly under-
stood it should be investigated at length in some of its other
ramifications.
3. Procedural and Practice Developments.21-Reference has
been made to the importance of litigating in the same action all
claims arising out of the same accident or transaction if an effec-
tive practice is to be achieved under a comparative negligence
statute. This development is no more than the usual code reforms
carried to their logical conclusion, and will not be an innovation in
the leading code states.
Provisions must be made for counterclaims between plaintiffs
and defendants, for the adding of third party defendants 22 in order
for the sued defendants to claim damages or contribution against
them and also for such third parties or already sued codefendants
to cross-claim against other defendants for damages or contribu-
tion, and for outside parties to come in and make themselves
parties to existing litigation in order to file claims and to be them-
selves subject to claims. The only limitation on such provisions
should be the requirement that all the claims involved must have
arisen out of the same accident or fact transaction giving rise to
the original action.
It is apparent that considerable difficulty may conceivably
arise where parties essential to the complete disposal of a cause of
20See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions, 142
et seq.21See in general Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence
Actions, ch. 12, p. 114.22For third party practice, a fairly recent development in America, see
Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendants' Rights against Third Par-
ties, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 147; Bennett, Bringing in Third Parties by
the Defendant, (1935) 19 MINNEsoTA LAW Raviaw 163; Gregory, Third
Party Practice under the New Illinois Practice Act and Chicago Municipal
Court Rules, (1934) 1 U. Chicago L. Rev. 536.
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action and all its resulting claims are outside the jurisdiction.23 In
many cases of this sort involving automobile accidents where the
absent persons are non-residents, it is possible to. secure service
on them through a statute24 such as that in Massachusetts which
compels them to appoint automatically, by their presence in the
state, the commissioner of motor vehicles as their agent to accept
service.25 But it is clear that some situations are bound to arise
where two or more separate actions may be necessary, requiring
separate findings by different juries on practically identical evi-
dence from the same witnesses.
One practical change that should certainly be considered, how-
ever, is abolition of the joint and several judgment. 28  This has
already been referred to; but it is worth stressing the fact that
where all parties to a law suit are negligent, there is little reason
for retaining a principle of practice like the joint judgment and
joint and several liability, which was developed in a system where
the plaintiff, to recover, had to be absolutely free from negligence.
If this device is retained, extremely difficult problems of shifting
the risk of insolvency and of placing the initiative on issuing exe-
cution are bound to arise. For why should a negligent plaintiff be
permitted to place on one of two negligent defendants the burden
of loss allocated to both such defendants collectively, when the
judgment is for considerably more than half of the plaintiff's actual
damage and the luckless judgment debtor executed against was
found to have been no more negligent than, if, indeed, as negligent
as, the plaintiff?
All of these matters, which of necessity can only be referred to
in this article, are discussed at considerable length elsewhere. Their
practical bearing on the general matter under discussion must not
be overlooked by a legislature interested in creating a system of
loss distribution based on comparative negligence.
4. Special Verdict or Findings in Trials Before Juries.--There
is a tendency in Ontario to have many of the negligence actions
tried before a court without a jury.27 But when cases are tried
23See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
at 115 et seq.24See ch. 90, Massachusetts, Gen. Laws current in 1923, as amended
by Massachusetts, Statutes 1923 ch. 431, sec. 2.25See Scott, jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists, (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 563.26See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
at p. 120.27See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
cases in Appendix A, p. 179.
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before juries, it has been found practicable under their compara-
tive negligence statute to require special verdicts or findings .2 The
confusion which would result from any other course.seems appar-
ent when one considers the number of interdependent claims that
have to be settled in a single action such as one of those illustrated
above in this article. The nature of the findings 29 themselves is
very simple, being first to determine which parties were negligent,
and in what proportions with respect to claims contributed to by
the negligence of more than one party. Then the jury must find
whose negligence contributed to whose damages, and then it must
find what the actual damage in issue amounted to with respect
to each party claiming. On these findings, it is submitted, the trial
court can always enter a judgment satisfactorily allocating the loss
to the various parties, although it seems apparent that if the jury
were to render a general verdict covering all the claims in issue,
confusion would result unless the case were extremely simple,
involving only one or two claims. Even then, if general verdicts
were given, the court would have no way to check up on the ac-
curacy of the deductions the jury made from the preliminary
findings the jury must have arrived at for its own convenience.
The Canadian jurisdictions have included in their statutes a
clause"0 which seems extremely desirable in practice under a
comparative negligence act, but which would be impossible to use
under statutes like these in Nebraska and Wisconsin. This clause
provides that if the trial judge determines from the evidence sub-
mitted that it would be impracticable to permit the jury to attempt
to apportion negligence nicely between two or more parties, he
should instruct the jury that if it finds such parties negligent at
all, they shall be held equally negligent. This device is frequently
used in Canadian cases and gives the judge a very sensible control
over the possible vagaries of a jury.
5. Abolition of Doctrines of Last Clear Chance or Ultimate
Negligence.-The doctrine of ultimate negligence which entered
the common law in Davies v. Mann,3' has become entrenched in
the Canadian jurisdictions having comparative negligence statutes,
and persists in spite of the fact that after the adoption of such
statutes its function had entirely ceased. For it seems very clear
28See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
cases in Appendix A, p. 179.
29See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
at 121 et seq.30E.g., sec. 5 of the Ontario statute, quoted supra p. 7.
31(1842) 10 M. & W. 546.
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that the common-law doctrine was initiated merely to overcome
the harshness of the strict common-law rule of contributory negli-
gence. Retention of this qommon-law doctrine along with the
statute results in a situation somewhat like that which obtains
under the Nebraska and Wisconsin statutes.
The appellate law surrounding this doctrine is extremely intri-
cate and the courts' task of administering the comparative negli-
gence Act is rendered far more difficult by the presence of an issue
considered by many leading Canadian lawyers to be quite unneces-
sary in view of the Act itself. 2 It is hardly conceivable that had
the comparative negligence act preceded the doctrine of ultimate
negligence the court would have adopted the common-law doctrine
in question.
6. Assumption of Risk and Breach of Statute as "Negligence"
under Comparative Negligence Statutes.--It has been a matter of
some doubt before the supreme court of Wisconsin whether or
not voluntary assumption of risk should be regarded as negligence
for the purpose of administering their comparative negligence
act.S3  Perhaps it would be advisable to leave the distinction be-
tween contributory negligence and assumption of risk to the
courts to work out, if a legislature contemplating the passage of
a comparative negligence law chooses not to make the two synony-
mous for the purpose of such an act. It is not apparent, however,
that the distinction should be retained.
There is a difference in kind between consciously confronting
a dangerous situation with complete appreciation of the hazard
involved, and carelessly but inadvertently exposing one's self to
the same situation. A legislature might be justified in concluding
that one guilty of the former type of conduct should not recover
any damages on the ground that the negligent defendant did not
contribute at all to the plaintiff's damages, but rather that it was
entirely the plaintiff's -fault for deliberately stepping into the path
of danger. This conclusion, however, is somewhat questionable,
although precedent for it exists.
The writer has examined the problem at considerable length
and in detail elsewhere, however, and has offered a suggested
statutory provision preserving the distinction along clearly defined
lines. '4 Whether or not this sort of provision is considered de-
82See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions,
126 et seq.33Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions 134.
"
4Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions, 170,
sec. 14(b) of the proposed draft statute.
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sirable, it cannot be denied that considerable thought should be
given to this matter by a legislature undertaking to introduce a
system of loss distribution based on comparative negligence.
It is more apparent that breach of a criminal statute, such as
safety traffic laws, should be regarded as negligence under com-
parative negligence acts. 5 This is a conclusion which slight in-
vestigation would confirm; and it is a matter of common knowledge
that social conduct prohibited or commanded by what are ordinar-
ily called safety statutes would, in the absence of such statutes,
usually be denominated as negligence by the courts. Indeed, about
the only difference the statutes make is to set a legislative standard
of reasonable conduct and thus to foreclose the jury from passing
on the issue of due care under the circumstances.?
CONCLUSION
The preceding brief account of some of the diffitulties of achiev-
ing a thoroughgoing system of loss distribution in negligence
actions is not calculated to discourage legislatures, but to warn
them of what they must inevitably face if they undertake any-
thing of the sort. Almost any sincere attempt to overhaul some
of the archaic doctrines of negligence, however, would be justified
in spite of the time and hard work such a venture is sure to re-
quire. The writer has, in another place, suggested a draft statute
which might be used as a point of departure by a legislature
determined to bring about a change of the kind under discus-
sion. 7  Although this draft statute is rather long and detailed,
it is very comprehensive both as to the substantive features re-
quired in such an act and as to the administrative and procedural
details necessary to make it work.
35Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions 139.
36See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, (1914) 27 Harv. L.
Rev. 317, Selected Essays on Law of Torts 276.
37This draft statute appears with comments on each section in chapter
14, pp. 154 et seq. of the writer's book, Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribu-
tion in Negligence Actions. The whole purpose in writing this book and in
drafting a proposed statute was to give legislatures interested in adopting
a system of loss distribution based on comparative negligence a fairly com-
plete survey of the task ahead of them and some assistance in undertaking
the task of intelligible and practical legislation. Naturally the writer expects
no legislature to enact his statute as it appears in the book. But he does
expect them to consider it seriously if they contemplate legislation of the
sort in their own states. The writer apologizes for having referred to
his own articles and book so frequently; but since so few people have
written on the practical aspects of this sort of legislation, he has found it
advisable and convenient to refer to these sources.
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The task of compiling a workable statute of tbis sort is not an
enviable one. It is hoped, however, that our American legislatures
will in the future perceive the folly of the one-sentence affairs
such as that of Mississippi and the proposed New York act, and
those of Nebraska and Wisconsin. With a model such as the
Ontario statute so close at hand, it is difficult to believe that they
will fail to do so.
